

**THE ARMY CORPS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE
HEADQUARTERS**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE ARMY CORPS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS by MAJ Darren
L. Irvine, USA, 57 pages.

This study investigates the doctrinal guidance available to a corps headquarters if required to serve as a joint task force headquarters and simultaneously be required to warfight the corps. The study contends that a corps being required to simultaneously serve as both headquarters is a viable scenario that is currently not addressed in joint or Army doctrine.

The study recommends that a corps headquarters can accomplish this dual tasking but will require augmentation that has not been identified in Army doctrine. The study addresses what augmentation may be needed and possible sources.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AI	Air Interdiction
ARFOR	Army Force
C2	Command & Control
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CAS	Close Air Support
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
EW	Electronic Warfare
EXORD	Execution Order
HQ	Headquarters
JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JSOC	Joint Special Operation Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
LRC	Lesser Regional Contingency

NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OPCON	Operational Command
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
SASO	Support and Stability Operations
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure(s)
TARABS	Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Battlefield Surveillance
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
USAREUR	United States Army Forces, United States European Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
WARNORD	Warning Order

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect vital security interests, US leadership may employ the military instrument of national power.¹ It is anticipated that future conflicts will occur at regional levels rather than global thereby requiring unified commanders in chief (CINCs) to tailor their response packages with assigned forces to resolve a situation. According to the National Military Strategy of 1995, "Modern warfare requires US forces to fight as a joint team whether operating unilaterally or as part of an international coalition . . . success in joint and combined operations requires bringing to bear, at the right times and places, the unique and complementary capabilities of each of the Services."² To achieve success in joint and combined operations, unified commanders will be required to activate and employ a joint task force (JTF). By doing so they create a joint headquarters (HQ) that can focus at the operational level thereby allowing the CINC to maintain focus on the theater as a whole. "A joint task force is that force constituted by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander or an existing joint task force commander when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. A joint task force maybe established with respect to geographical area or functional basis."³ It is generally composed of elements from two or more of the services though the Navy and Marines working together will

not constitute a JTF. As the likelihood of Army forces fighting as components of JTFs increases, so does the probability of Army corps serving as headquarters of future JTF operations.

There are historical examples to support an assumption that Army corps will serve as JTF headquarters in the future. In March 1988, "The XVIII Airborne Corps served as JTF headquarters in the Honduras during a border security mission in operation 'Golden Pheasant'"⁴. This operation was little more than a prelude to operations that would continue against Panamanian dictator Noriega and the Panamanian defense forces. A little over one year later, the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps served as the headquarters of Joint Task Force South during operation "Just Cause" in Panama.

"In 1994, US military forces stood ready to invade the island of Haiti under the combatant command of CINCACOM. Plans for the invasion called for the formation of Joint Task Force 180, again formed around the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters."⁵ The purpose of this JTF was to conduct forced entry operations onto the island to insure protection of human rights and to provide the installation and continuation of a politically friendly government to the United States.

These are three examples of an Army corps serving as JTF headquarters over the past nine years. However, there are other examples of other service headquarters performing as JTF headquarters as well. "As recently as 1992, The First Marine Expeditionary Force was established as the core of a JTF designated to provide a secure environment to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia."⁶

“The authority establishing the joint task force will designate the commander and assign him the mission and the appropriate forces.”⁷ Which commander and unit is selected to serve as the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) is dependent upon the mission, geographic location, and objectives to be met. Recent history shows that the Army’s corps are likely to serve as the cores of future JTFs.

Primary Research Question

While there are historical examples, nothing currently exists in the way of Army doctrine or other guidance, that describes how or if a corps headquarters, once activated as a JTF headquarters, will also fight as a corps. There is doctrinal information available that discusses what augmentation must be made available to the Army corps staff for mission execution as a JTF headquarters. Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations (June 1996), addresses this issue to some degree in chapter 4. Additional information on augmentation can be found in the directives of the Unified Commands and in corps standing operating procedures (SOPs). However, these documents can vary greatly in the detail of their contents.

Augmenting the corps staff when it is standing-up as a JTF headquarters is addressed in Army doctrine and in other references. However, doctrine does not address how an Army corps serving as a JTF headquarters will also fight as a corps if required. This leads to the thesis question, “Can an Army Corps fight as a corps while simultaneously serving as a unilateral joint task force headquarters?” The term unilateral is used here to limit the research to a US forces only JTF. The distinct possibility of integrating forces from other nations will not be addressed.

Secondary Research Questions

For a corps headquarters to serve as a JTF headquarters some type of staff augmentation must be received. This will be more critical should the corps headquarters serving as the JTF headquarters have to fight as a corps as well. The combatant commanders provide guidance through their directives and local regulations as to how augmentation will be made available. However, nowhere has Army doctrine described what is required at a minimum for the corps to function adequately as a JTF headquarters and simultaneously fight as a corps. This raises the following questions: "What augmentation is required for the corps headquarters to serve as a JTF headquarters and warfight the corps simultaneously?" and "Where should augmentation of the warfighting corps headquarters it be expected to come from?"

When required only to activate as a JTF headquarters, the corps will receive its augmentation from various sources. An obvious first source would be for the newly formed JTF headquarters to receive all of its augmentation from the staff of the combatant commander directing formation of the task force. However, Field Manual 100-15-1 (draft) states that the newly activated JTF headquarters should expect to receive and integrate as many as 200-300 augmentees in a three-to-five day period. With such an influx of personnel, is it logical to expect the CINC to release such a large portion of his staff to a subordinate headquarters? Were this to be the case, the CINC might as well assume the responsibilities of the JTF commander himself. Therefore, the JTF augmentation will come from other organizations as well. Army doctrine currently identifies this augmentation and probable sources. These sources are in line with the directives of the examined unified commands. This doctrine serves to inform the corps headquarters serving as the JTF headquarters what support it can

expect and where it is likely to come from. This also facilitates training and liaison during peacetime between corps and the supporting elements. Restated, doctrine is available that addresses how a corps headquarters will be augmented to serve as a JTF headquarters.

What Army corps doctrine currently does not address is how the corps will serve as the JTF headquarters and, if required, simultaneously fight as a corps. Should the majority of the corps staff be required to fulfill the tasks of fighting the JTF, how will the remaining corps headquarters fight the corps? This scenario is not addressed in doctrine. Any augmentation required to accomplish this mission, likewise, is not addressed.

Assumptions

This research is based on the following assumptions:

1. The corps headquarters serving as the JTF headquarters will not serve as the Army force (ARFOR) headquarters for contingency operations.
2. No new initiatives or programs will be introduced by the Joint Staff or Unified Commanders in the near future that will require the creation of a standing JTF.
3. The procedures that each of the Army's corps will use to activate as a JTF headquarters will vary due to differences in the current mission and readiness status.
4. No new doctrinal initiatives at Army or joint level will drive the JTF organization in a entirely new direction in the near future.

Definition of Terms

Administrative Control (ADCON). Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or organizations⁸

Assign. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.⁹

Attach. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.¹⁰

CINC. Commander of a combatant command (unified or specified); commander in chief.¹¹

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.¹²

Combatant Command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographical or functional responsibilities.¹³

Combatant Command (COCOM). COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands. It may not be

delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.¹⁴

Combatant Commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.¹⁵

Contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.¹⁶

Crisis Action Planning (CAP). (1) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. (2) The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.¹⁷

Doctrine. Fundamental principle by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.¹⁸

Joint Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff.¹⁹

Joint Force. A general applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control.²⁰

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.²¹

Joint Task Force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.²²

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.²³

Operational Control (OPCON). Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.²⁴

Service Component Command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force.²⁵

Specified Command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is

composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant commands.²⁶

Unified Command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command.²⁷

Limitations

Since the institution of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Services have been forced to begin the process of integrating and operating in the realm of jointness. In particular, doctrine concerning JTF formation and activation is evolving. Joint doctrine rightfully addresses this process with a broad brush in its publications (Joint Pubs 0-2, 3-0, 5-00., 5-00.2). The Unified Commands have regulations that address procedures that will be used within the command in the event of activation and formation of a JTF. However, joint publications, unified command guidance, and Army doctrine currently do not identify how a corps would serve as a JTF headquarters and fight as a corps simultaneously. Likewise Army doctrine does not address the requirements of personnel and capabilities augmentation for a corps staff to successfully serve as a JTF headquarters and simultaneously fight as a corps.

This research will seek to address the possibility of a corps headquarters that is serving as a JTF headquarters, to continue to warfight the corps simultaneously. It will also address how current augmentation and capabilities packages are expected to be made available and what issues must be considered, identified, and addressed by Army

doctrine. Due to availability of sources, the directives and standing operating procedures (SOPs) will be used from only two of the combatant commands, United States European Command (USEUCOM) and United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), and from two of the Army Corps (I Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps). Additional resources were sought but due to the time constraints of this research, only the aforementioned sources were available.

It is imperative for the Army to identify its requirements for a corps headquarters to serve as a JTF headquarters in various contingencies. The varying nature of contingencies that could arise requiring the formation of a JTF make it all but impossible to come up with one comprehensive scenario to address the corps capabilities and augmentation problem of fighting the corps while serving as a JTF headquarters. Therefore this research will address the formation of a task force stood up to deal with a contingency that requires dealing with an enemy force.

Delimitations

Given a medium-to-high intensity conflict, this research will address the corps headquarters tasked to serve as a JTF headquarters in a unilateral contingency and simultaneously warfight the corps. The corps commander will not be expected to serve as the commander of all Army forces (COMARFOR) and the JTF as well. There are many scenarios that could arise requiring the activation of a JTF. A national emergency as was the case during hurricane Andrew, special operations JTFs, or JTF Full Accounting (POW-MIA). This research will not consider nor address these scenarios. It will address the scenario that requires activation of a JTF that will contend with an enemy force in a medium-to- high intensity conflict.

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub of 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 September 1993), vii.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 14.

³Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 11 August 1994), xvi.

⁴Gregory L. Kammerer, Is the Army Properly Postured to Support Commander in Chief Requirements for Future Joint Task Force Headquarters Operations? (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 28.

⁵Ibid., 40.

⁶Ibid., 35.

⁷. Joint Pub 0-2, IV-9.

⁸Ibid., GL-3.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid, GL-4.

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 13 April 1995), GL-1.

¹² Joint Pub 0-2, GL-4.

¹³Ibid., GL-5.

¹⁴ Joint Pub of 3-0, II-7.

¹⁵ Joint Pub 0-2, GL-4.

¹⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994), 93.

¹⁷Ibid., 106.

¹⁸Joint Pub 0-2, GL-6.

¹⁹Joint Pub 1-02, 219.

²⁰Joint Pub 0-2, GL-6.

²¹Joint Pub 1-02, 223.

²²Joint Pub 0-2, GL-6.

²³Joint Pub 1-02, 265.

²⁴Ibid., 301.

²⁵Ibid., GL-375.

²⁶Joint Pub 0-2, GL-8.

²⁷Ibid., GL-9.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine addresses standing up a JTF in terms that are obscure with regard to the Army corps headquarters. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), links joint doctrine to national security strategy and national military strategy. It sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action for joint operations. It outlines the nature of joint operations and the comprehensive exercise of command authority in their conduct.¹ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting joint and multinational operations, as well as interagency operations, across the range of military operations (war and operations other than war). It guides the planning and execution of combatant command strategy, campaigns, and joint operations.² Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, establishes responsibilities for planning for joint operations. It promulgates doctrine, principles, and concepts that govern: (1) planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces for joint operations; (2) development and execution of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation orders; (3) integration of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) with other joint systems and processes; (4) integration of joint operation planning with the administrative and logistic functions of the military departments and services; and (5)

use of joint operation planning to support functions of capability assessment and force development.³

Finally, Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, establishes joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing, and redeploying a joint task force (JTF) for short-notice contingency operations.⁴ It further states, "When mission requirements exceed the JTF staff's capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), assistance must be requested through the superior commander."⁵ "The authority establishing the JTF should make provision to furnish the necessary personnel or equipment."⁶ This same publication also states, "No one commander can control the detailed action of a large number of units or individuals."⁷

Common doctrine is essential for a mutual understanding and confidence between a commander and assigned subordinates and among the subordinates themselves.⁸ From it comes the directives that the unified commanders develop and the operating procedures developed by the corps to support the unified commanders. Joint doctrine provides the underpinnings from which these documents originate and are developed upon.

Unified Commands

United States European Command (USEUCOM) Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization, assigns responsibilities, prescribes procedures, and directs actions related to JTF HQ organizations established in the EUCOM theater of operations. The directive consists of an overview of CINCEUR's policy and concept for JTF operations. The directive also contains

functional chapters which divide responsibilities, missions, and functions between the USEUCOM and JTF staffs and identify the standing operating procedures through which the two staffs will interface. Thirdly, the directive details the organization, missions, and functions of the augmentation elements the JTF commander may receive if required. Finally, the directive documents each component-based JTF HQ staff organization and includes mission statements, contingency scenarios, and deployment timelines for planning.⁹

United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures, covers much of the same ground as the EUCOM directive, though not in the same amount of detail. The document presents CINCUSACOM's procedures for establishing and employing JTFs for both operations and training. It presents an overview of the CJTF's responsibilities and major decisions to be made by him in the process of organizing and establishing the JTF HQs. It also describes the typical functions and responsibilities for the JTF staff sections, joint boards, and agencies. Unlike the USEUCOM directive, the USACOM SOP is geared towards a JTF headquarters sized to undertake a lesser regional contingency (LRC).

Army Doctrine

Where must those who develop joint doctrine and the unified commanders derive the information and input needed to develop doctrine and guidance concerning the activation of a JTF headquarters? To identify where shortcomings may be anticipated and how they may be overcome? To a large extent these agencies should be able to look to the Army's own doctrine for input as to the capabilities and possible

shortfalls of standing up a corps headquarters as a JTF headquarters and requiring it to fight as a corps as well. However, current Army doctrine does not address these challenges in any detail.

FM 100-5, Operations, states that it is, "the Army's authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war."¹⁰ "As the Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations. FM 100-5 undergirds all of the Army's doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, and soldier concerns."¹¹ However, with respect to standing-up an Army organization as a JTF, the field manual offers very little. "If the JTF operation requires the commitment of large land forces over a large land AO, the Army component commander may be the JTF commander. He could be a corps or numbered army commander. Thus, while usually fighting at the tactical or operational level, a corps commander (as a JTF commander) could be required to plan and conduct a joint campaign to achieve strategic objectives, employing forces from multiple services. In this event, the JTF establishing authority should provide additional communications, intelligence, and planning capabilities."¹²

At this point, it may seem logical to turn to the Army's doctrine on Corps operations, specifically FM 100-15, for doctrine concerning the corps headquarters acting as a JTF HQ. The manual states that one of its purposes is, "to help Army units develop operational and training plans for conducting activities as a JTF headquarters."¹³ "The corps staff must transition to a joint staff structure to ensure unity of effort within the task force."¹⁴ Although the JTF establishing authority is responsible for providing personnel and resources for the corps when the corps is a JTF, "it is the responsibility of the CJTF to determine and articulate what augmentation

requirements he needs for the task at hand and coordinate support through the establishing authority.”¹⁵ Unfortunately, all of this discussion focuses on the corps headquarters as a joint task force headquarters and does not address the possibility of fighting as two separate headquarters simultaneously; the corps would actually fill both roles.

Investigation reveals that two former Leavenworth students have prepared papers on the Army corps and JTFs in the past five years. Major John E. Sterling notes in “The Corps in the JTF Role” that “a corps headquarters can function well as a JTF for a well-rehearsed operation involving small numbers of mostly single service forces. However, the second observation is that where little advance notice and preplanning are available, and where significant forces from other services are involved, the potential for serious joint coordination and integration problems is very high”¹⁶ More recently, Major Gregory L. Kammerer in “Is the Army Properly Postured to Support Commander in Chief Requirements for Future Joint Task Force Headquarters Operations?”, compared the ability of the corps to act as a joint task force headquarters to that of the other services. Among his many conclusions, he noted that a corps HQ can function effectively as a joint task force with augmentation.¹⁷ He also noted that Army staff officers are adequately trained to perform on short notice in the capacity of a JTF HQ staff officer by virtue of the focus of Joint Professional Military Education instruction at the Command and General Staff College and US Army War College.¹⁸ Kammerer mentions continuing “gaps” in Army doctrine concerning the joint task force at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC) and the need for doctrine devoted to JTF operations.¹⁹ Although Majors Sterling and Kammerer address the corps as a JTF

headquarters, they do not address the possibility of the corps headquarters simultaneously fighting as a corps.

Currently in draft form is the revised FM 100-15, Corps Operations scheduled for release in July 1997. In Appendix D of this manual is the Army's first serious attempt at defining the specifics required to stand up a corps headquarters as a JTF headquarters. This manual in its current draft is not intended to address the issue of a corps headquarters dual hatted to serve as the JTF headquarters and simultaneously fighting the corps.

In a period of evolving joint doctrine concerning JTF operations, it is imperative that the Army clearly articulate in its doctrine the capabilities and shortcomings that can be anticipated should the corps be required to fight as a corps and serve as a JTF headquarters at the same time. Although Army doctrine addresses where augmentation for the JTF HQ will likely originate, it must also address the issue of augmenting the remaining corps staff that will not serve on the JTF HQ staff, but will remain to fight the corps.

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 11 August 1994), xvi.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 September 1993), xvii.

³Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-0., Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 13 April 1995), xv.

⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 1991), I-1.

⁵*Ibid.*, IV-1.

⁶Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸Ibid., II-9.

⁹USEUCOM, Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization (Stuttgart, Germany: USEUCOM HQ, 7 July 1995), EX-1.

¹⁰HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), v.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 4-4.

¹³HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1996), 4-24.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶John E. Sterling, The Corps in the JTF Role (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992), 39.

¹⁷Gregory L. Kammerer, Is the Army Properly Postured to Support Commander in Chief Requirements for Future Joint Task Force Headquarters Operations? (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 91.

¹⁸Ibid., 92.

¹⁹Ibid., 96.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

A review of the current literature demonstrates that Army doctrine is practically nonexistent with respect to fighting the corps when assigned as a JTF headquarters and simultaneously required to fight as a corps. Additionally, doctrine does not address the possible requirements necessary to augment a corps headquarters staff when activated as a JTF headquarters and conducting the corps warfight. Although history has shown us that JTFs have stood up, operated successfully, and disbanded in the past when serving only as the JTF headquarters, it does not address the corps having to fulfill the dual-hatted role of serving as the JTF headquarters and warfighting the corps. How will this occur especially with such obvious holes in the current Army doctrine? It will be useful to study the guidance from joint publications, the unified commands, Army corps, and Army doctrine to see what direction is available to assist in standing up future JTFs and what, if any, augmentation they will be provided. After comparing available information, a knowledge of what is needed for an Army corps to fight as a corps and serve as a JTF headquarters at the same time may become available. If sufficient guidance is not available, the direction that future doctrine development should take may become apparent.

This thesis will review doctrine, directives, and standing operating procedures from EUCOM, ACOM, I Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Joint Publications. The following format will be used:

Table 1

Format for Portraying the Availability of Information
Pertaining to a Warfighting Corps Headquarters
Simultaneously Serving as a JTF Headquarters

	Joint Pubs	Army Doctrine	EUCOM Directive	ACOM SOP	V Corps SOP	XVIII Corps SOP
JTF						
Corps						
Both						
JTF Aug						
Corps Aug						

This table will address the following:

1. JTF--Does the reference provide guidance pertaining to how the corps will stand-up and conduct operations as a JTF HQ?
2. Corps--Does the reference provide guidance pertaining to how the corps HQ will fight the corps?
3. Both--Does the reference provide guidance pertaining to how the corps HQ will simultaneously serve as a JTF HQs *and* serve as the corps HQ that fights the corps?
4. JTF Aug--Does the reference provide guidance pertaining to augmentation of the JTF HQ?
5. Corps Aug--Does the reference provide guidance pertaining to augmentation of the corps HQs serving as the JTF HQ and simultaneously fighting the corps?

Joint Publications

Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate and fundamentally think about war. Doctrine is authoritative, providing insights and wisdom gained from the military's collective experience with warfare. Neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.¹ Unified action demands maximum interoperability between the unified commanders and the services. The forces, units, and systems of all services must operate together effectively. This effectiveness is achieved in part through interoperability, which includes collective effort to develop and use joint doctrine.² Rightfully so, joint doctrine tends to be vague when applying to the corps level and below. Applicable publications (Joint Pubs 0-2, 3-0, 5-00., 5-00.2) will be reviewed for content, guidance, and direction as they pertain to the corps headquarters and its functions when activating as a JTF HQ and simultaneously fighting the corps.

Unified Commands

The documents of the two unified commands used in this thesis (USACOM & USEUCOM), provide the CINC's guidance for activating and augmenting a JTF. Both are similar in nature providing broad guidance, available augmentation and its sources. More detailed of the two, the EUCOM directive provides initial mission statements and allocation of forces for planning. Both documents layout staff responsibilities, organization, and procedures. Both help develop a JTF headquarters around a nucleus formed by the CJTF's own staff.

Neither the USEUCOM directive nor the USACOM JTF SOP address how the corps will fight once the corps headquarters is assigned to serve as the JTF headquarters. This is a key issue since future JTFs, as previously addressed, will likely revolve around the corps. This issue is not addressed in Army doctrine as well. This paper will examine the functions a corps headquarters is required to perform and compare them to the functions required to perform when serving as a JTF headquarters.

The Corps

The corps examined in this thesis (I & XVIII) have their own SOPs that describe the JTF headquarters organization when the corps commander is designated as the JTF commander. Both describe the responsibilities and procedures for organizing and operating as a JTF headquarters. Neither discuss the standing operating procedures for the JTF components. Both SOPs provide guidance for the conduct of sustained tactical operations. As such, they tend to amplify but not repeat doctrine, tactics, or techniques that are provided in Field Manuals and joint publications. These publications are more specific than guidance provided in joint publications and the directives of the unified commands.

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 January 1995) vi.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 15 July 1994) 11.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Field Manual 100-15, Corps Operations, notes that a corps headquarters may function as the Army service headquarters of a subordinate joint force, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) headquarters of a JTF, or as the JTF headquarters itself. In such cases the corps headquarters is responsible for both operation and tactical planning and operational and tactical execution of the campaign. As a JTF headquarters, the corps commander will be subordinate to the establishing authority and will look to him for guidance, strategic direction, and missions for the joint force. The CJTF also forms a joint staff and establishes joint boards and centers, as necessary, to command and control the force. This ensures that the staff is representative of the joint force and provides a structure for planning and executing joint operations.¹ History tells us that these functions are likely to become the responsibility of a corps commander and his headquarters.

Army Corps Doctrine

Corps are the largest tactical units in the US Army. They are by definition the instruments by which higher echelons of command conduct operations at the operational level.² Corps may be assigned divisions of any type the theater and mission requires. They possess support commands and are assigned combat and combat service organizations based on their needs for a specific operation.³ Today's corps will most

likely find itself conducting force projection operations as part of a tailored joint force. When the mission calls for a preponderance of land power, the corps may perform duties as the joint task force headquarters.⁴ The corps is the central point on the battlefield where the commander synchronizes combat power to achieve tactical and operational advantage over the enemy. Critical roles of the corps include:

1. Planning and conducting operations with other elements of the joint force to achieve campaign objectives.

2. Coordinating available Air Force, Navy, and Marine combat, CS, and CSS units.

3. Collection of intelligence, anticipating enemy activities and intentions, and planning future operations.

4. Planning and conducting simultaneous operations in depth.

5. Nominating targets for nuclear weapons employment in support of campaign objectives.

6. Planning and conducting effective deception operations according to the higher echelon's deception plan.⁵

These are several of the key functions an Army corps must conduct during the conduct of planning and campaign execution.

Some of the capabilities of an Army corps have been discussed. What are the specific functions that the headquarters of the corps must accomplish? By doctrine the corps headquarters consists of the commander, deputy commander, and the staff. The staff consists of coordinating and special staffs and are responsible to assist the corps commander with:

1. Deriving the corps mission.
2. Setting objectives.
3. Determining the concept of operations.
4. Developing and assigning missions to subordinate units.
5. Task-organizing the corps for combat.
6. Influencing the battle by assigning missions.
7. Establishing priorities.
8. Allocating resources.
9. Synchronizing operations with the corps battle space.⁶

The duties and responsibilities of the corps staff are immense and critical to the successful functioning of the corps.

There are several key aspects of corps staff activities that are different from lower echelons. "First, because of the interface with multinational forces, Host Nation agencies, and sister services, there are large numbers of liaison elements from these agencies working at the corps headquarters."⁷ "Second, the coordination of USAF, USMC, USN, and SOF support is especially critical at the corps level. This is essential to ensure the corps gains maximum benefit by integrating available close air support (CAS), air interdiction (AI), tactical air reconnaissance and aerial battlefield surveillance (TARABS), electronic warfare (EW), counter-air operations, tactical airlift, naval gunfire, air and missile support, and sealift into the theater."⁸ "Third, the corps must continuously plan into the future to anticipate battlefield conditions and then move forces and assemble resources in time to successfully fight the enemy. To plan continuously, the staff must anticipate conditions that may exist several days ahead."⁹ Figure 1 depicts a typical corps staff organization. Field Manual 101-5,

Command and Control for Commanders and Staff, discusses in detail the specific responsibilities of the corps headquarters, coordinating, special, and personal staffs.

A thorough review of Army corps doctrine reveals no guidance for a corps HQ that is dual-hatted to serve as the JTF headquarters and simultaneously warfighting the corps. Doctrine is available that instructs on how to conduct operations as one or the other. However, with the distinct possibility of a corps assuming this dual functioned role, the Army provides zero guidance to assist the corps commander or his staff as to how to conduct this mission.

USEUCOM

USCINCEUR Policy Letter 94-1 directs the development of component-based JTF HQ organizations. Specifically, each component is to maintain the capability to establish JTF headquarters based on the notional missions and scenarios assigned in EUCOM Directive 55-11.¹⁰ EUCOM Directive 55-11, states that USAREUR headquarters will be prepared to deploy the nucleus of two different JTF headquarters. One JTF HQ will be focused on humanitarian/disaster relief operations and NEO operations conducted in an uncertain or hostile environment. The other JTF HQ nucleus will be prepared to conduct mid-to-high intensity combat operations.¹¹

More specifically, USAREUR is tasked in this directive to be prepared to serve as a JTF headquarters with the following generic mission: "When directed, COMJTF deploys US forces to Country A, defeats Country B armed forces in Country A, restores and then secures the Country B/Country A inner border. On order, conducts mission handoff to UN forces and redeploys US forces."¹² Within USAREUR, V Corps receives

the mission to serve as the JTF headquarters prepared to conduct mid-to-high intensity combat operations. The notional force list contains the following units:

1. Army: 4X DIVs, 3X Corps AVN Bdes, 6X FA Bdes, 1X SIG Bde, 1X ADA Bde, 1X MP Bde, 1X COSCOM
2. Air Force: 2X Air Wings (F/A), 1X Air Wing (Bomb)
3. Navy: 1X CVBG, 1X Amph Sqdn, 1X NMCB, 1 Hosp ship
4. Marine: 1X MARG w/MEUSOC
5. Special Ops: 2X SP Ops BNs, 1X PSYOP TF, 1X CA GP

This is a sizable amount of force that could be made available to the JTF for utilization in the advent of combat operations. There can be very little doubt that, once activated, the JTF staff will have it's hands full developing the JTF mission, deciding objectives, determining concepts of operation, establishing priorities, and allocating resources for the JTF.

"The centerpiece of the EUCOM concept is to provide the nucleus of each joint task force headquarters from an existing staff that is organic to one of the components (USAREUR or V Corps)."¹³ "To augment these mainly service specific nuclei, EUCOM maintains a variety of battled rostered "joint plugs" to provide the headquarters the required joint expertise and functional capability not available within the service component."¹⁴ These plugs are selectively added to the service nucleus as required for any specific operation. The following joint plugs are formed by EUCOM and available to the CJTF as needed:

1. USEUCOM Core
2. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
3. Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) Cell

4. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Cell
5. JTF Communications Cell
6. Engineering Cell
7. Joint Mobility Assistance Team¹⁵

The service cores augmented with the various joint plugs train together and will form the backbone of any USEUCOM JTF.

EUCOM plans that a V Corps led joint task force organization could command and control four Army divisions, three air wings, a carrier battle group, and one marine regiment.¹⁶ The commander of the JTF would request his augmentation three days after receiving the EUCOM execution order (N Day). He will receive his support by N+5/N+7. Should maximum augmentation be requested by the JTF commander, the V Corps staff will receive over 800 personnel from throughout the EUCOM theater in three-to-five days.

If the former V Corps staff, now JTF staff, will be decisively engaged in planning for all of the forces of the JTF, the logical question then becomes, "If V Corps headquarters is tasked to lead and fight the JTF, who and with what remaining headquarters structure, will lead and fight the corps?" Unfortunately, this issue, as in Army doctrine, is not addressed by EUCOM.

U.S Atlantic Command (USACOM)

Although a draft document, ACOM's JTF HQ-SOP also provides insights into how units under the auspices of this unified command may expect to conduct operations. As with EUCOM, "it is the policy of CINCUSACOM to develop JTF staffs around the 'nucleus' of the CJTF's own staff."¹⁷ If a corps commander with a typical

organization such as depicted in figure (2), is assigned the duties of CJTF, he will be forced to form his JTF staff with members from his corps staff and receive augmentation as needed, from various locations. The primary source of augmentees will be the USACOM Service component staffs and subordinate commands. USACOM will provide various augmentation packages such as JIC augmentation and liaison teams. Based on the CJTF's judgment, specialized functions may be performed by JTF Staff or by a command architecture of functional component commanders or a mixture of both.¹⁸ Pending request from the CJTF, other CINC-arranged augmentation includes:

1. JTF-Joint Intelligence Center (JTF-JIC)
2. Politico-military cell
3. LNOs from DoD and non-DoD agencies
4. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)
5. Civil-Military Operations personnel
6. Joint Information Bureau (JIB)
7. Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB)
8. MWR teams for troop support in austere environment
9. Joint Frequency Management Office (JFMO)

Although not as detailed as the EUCOM directive in terms of battle-staff rostering and identifying by component the number of personnel to be provided, ACOM's Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures outlines similar concepts. As with the EUCOM directive, the corps that is serving as the JTF headquarters and required to simultaneously warfight the corps, is not addressed.

A review of these unified command documents raises questions concerning doctrine used to develop these JTF concepts. Specifically, will evolving Army doctrine be driven by the directives and SOPs of unified commands concerning JTF operations? Currently, there appears to be ample guidance available to the CJTF/corps commander as to activating and augmenting the JTF headquarters. However, these documents contain no information pertaining to simultaneously serving as the JTF HQ and warfighting the corps.

The question that the Army has failed to address anywhere in its doctrine is "How are the remaining corps combat and supporting units commanded and controlled for combat when the CJTF and his corps headquarters are serving as a JTF headquarters?" Although corps doctrine indicates that the corps can serve in various capacities (JTF HQ, ARFOR, JFLCC), it also states that the same corps headquarters cannot perform these missions simultaneously. Likewise, current, Army doctrine does not define how the corps minus a very large percentage of its headquarters serving as the joint force headquarters, will be commanded and controlled for the purpose of fighting as a corps. Yet, the Army is in a position where it will have to handle this mission as the unified commands plan for the use of the corps as a JTF HQ.

Upon activation, the joint task force headquarters must rapidly transition to prepare for the mission at hand. The CJTF and his staff collectively:

1. Plan operations of the JTF in accordance with operational direction from the establishing authority (including deployment, employment, and redeployment).
2. Direct, control and coordinate operations of assigned forces.

3. Under supervision of the joint staff, establish, when required, joint boards and agencies to plan, control, and coordinate the use of joint assets in specific functional areas.

4. Coordinate with other joint and multinational forces, the UN, other government agencies not assigned, and NGOs and PVOs.

5. Coordinate with other national forces and/or foreign governments when required by the establishing authority.

6. Coordinate signal support.

7. Monitor accomplishment of the JTF commander's decisions.¹⁹

It is apparent that the staff of a JTF has a great deal to accomplish when focused on all of the Service forces assigned. It becomes clear that, without additional assistance, it would be virtually impossible for the corps staff to command and control the entire JTF and simultaneously meet the requirements of a corps staff that have been previously discussed. The Army has a problem to which there is no easy solution.

Options for Warfighting the Corps

If the CINC should assign a corps the JTF mission in a mid-to-high intensity environment similar to the EUCOM example, what are the options available to the corps commander for fighting the corps? One option for consideration would be to bring in another corps headquarters to serve as the JTF headquarters and allow the corps proper to participate in the warfight. Currently, there are only four corps headquarters (I, III, V, & XVIII), that could be considered for this option. However, this would be a readiness and resourcing problem from the start. Standing up a JTF and utilizing a separate corps headquarters would involve one half of the Army's corps-

level command and control assets. Additionally readiness would be impacted, especially if the contingency corps headquarters were to be utilized. This would also be an excessive amount of resources for one theater when only a corps level JTF were required to begin with.

A second option for consideration in assisting the JTF headquarters to warfight the corps, would be to make one of the assigned divisions responsible for fighting the corps. Once the corps headquarters assumed the JTF mission, a subordinate division might assume the duties of corps headquarters and continue to fight the division as well. Current division doctrine states that the division may deploy as part of a JTF without its traditional corps headquarters and supporting corps units. In these types of operations, a division often works directly for the joint force commander. Therefore, divisions must know joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. "Army doctrine states that divisions are not normally designated as joint task force headquarters."²⁰ A typical division (figure 3) commands and controls 3X ground maneuver brigades, 1X aviation brigade, 1X division artillery brigade, 1X engineer brigade, and 1X support command. The division may be manned from 12,500 to 16,000 soldiers.

When fighting as a division exclusive of the additional duty of serving as the corps headquarters, it is the function of the division staff to support the commander by:

1. Accurately determine the current situation.
2. Anticipate what the commander feels needs to be done.
3. Develop sound courses of action.
4. Assess courses of action for the commander.
5. Issue the necessary orders and instructions.

6. Monitor how well orders and instructions are being executed.
7. Alter the plan in accordance with unit feedback, commander's guidance, and commander's intent.
8. Plan future operations.
9. Synchronize actions prior to combat operations.²¹

With a division staff organized to command and control 5-6 brigades and their required support, it is improbable that a division staff without significant augmentation, could lead a corps consisting of up to four divisions and adequately complete the tasks above that are required to operate the division. Following the possibility of the EUCOM example, one division headquarters could be responsible for warfighting 4X divisions, 3X Corps Avn BDEs, and 6X FA BDES. This would be a staggering task for the division headquarters. If augmentation of the corps were to be considered, it would be better utilized augmenting the remaining corps staff to fight the corps. This amount of combat power and related support is too much for a division headquarters to command and control in a warfight considering all of the responsibilities a division headquarters is required to complete.

The third and most viable option for the corps to serve as the JTF headquarters and fight the corps, is to split and augment the remaining corps headquarters. Based on directives and standing operating procedures, I, V, and XVIII Corps plan to utilize the majority of the corps headquarters to form the JTF headquarters core. The core staff will then be augmented by members of various component commands that support the theater CINC as well as a forward deployed team sent from the headquarters of the unified command. The forward deployed teams are identified in advance and are battle-rostered so that they may deploy rapidly. The CINC's teams are sent to the JTF

headquarters to assist the newly formed joint staffs during the initial days of the operation. It is important to note that these teams are provided to assist the commander of the JTF, not provide guidance or act as a conduit to the CINC. They work for the CJTF.

The size of the corps headquarters will vary depending on the type of corps (heavy vs rapid deployment). Once the CINC has ordered JTF activation, approximately 300-400 members will leave the corps headquarters to form the JTF core. Based on the contingency at hand and the capabilities required by the JTF commander, the JTF headquarters may swell to over 800 soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, and civilians.²² This process is likely to occur at a rapid pace following activation. EUCOM for example, expects to adhere to a timeline that allows the JTF to begin crisis action planning, receive headquarters augmentation and begin unit deployment within ten days of the CINC receiving the execute order from the national command authority (Table 2). Based on EUCOM's deployment timeline, a corps headquarters can expect to stand-up as a JTF headquarters very rapidly. Likewise, what little staff that remains with the corps will have to be augmented quickly as well. This transition will need to be seamless requiring training and forethought before commencement.

Augmentation of the newly formed corps staff will be difficult. Depending on the mission, the service components may have given up a large number of their personnel to the newly formed JTF. This means that the corps may have difficulty receiving personnel to support their effort from their higher Army headquarters (i.e. USAREUR). Should this prove to be the case, the corps headquarters will have to look to its subordinate units for augmentation.

Table 2

JTF Deployment Timeline

<i>JTF DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE</i>	
EXORD Received	N Day
Form JTF HQ/Initiate CAP	N+1/N+3
Mission Analysis	N+2/N+3
Issue WARNORD	N+4
Request JTF HQ Augmentation	N+3
Receive Augmentation	N+5/N+7
Mission hand-off from CINC HQ	N+6
Develop OPLAN	N+3/N+6
Issue JTF OPORD	N+8
Validate TPFDD	N+8/N+10
Begin Force Deployment	N+10

Source: USEUCOM, Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization (Stuttgart, Germany: 7 July 1995), B-1.

The EUCOM scenario of up to four subordinate divisions, three corps aviation brigades, six field artillery brigades, and a corps support command, seems to provide enough force structure from which the corps may draw its augmentation from. Note here that although the JTF may fill with up to four divisions, only two of them will be from within the EUCOM theater. The remaining two divisions will deploy from CONUS. This will likely mean that that the CJTF would have only two divisions from which to choose from to round-out his warfighting corps staff. The CJTF would likely not be inclined to wait for the two CONUS divisions to deploy and arrive in country.

Prior planning by the corps commander and his staff will have to occur before this scenario develops as to which members of his staff will remain with the corps and which members will go forward to compose the core of the JTF headquarters. In all likelihood, the primary staff will go forward with the commander to the JTF leaving assistants and deputies to run the corps. It will be essential for these remaining personnel to be familiar with the roles and duties of the primary staff officers. As the assistants and deputies will now compose the primary core of the corps staff, their success is essential.

The divisions and other units of the JTF cannot be broken out to augment the corps staff unless the JTF commander exercises operational control (OPCON)) over these units. OPCON provides the commander authority to perform those functions involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.²³ Requesting OPCON authority during JTF formation is crucial for the success of this scenario.

With the wide variety of forces that will serve to form the JTF, the corps commander should be able to form an adequate staff to command and control the corps. Operators will be available from the divisions, as well as representatives from the combat support and combat service support units. Fires and aviation support can be made available from the corps aviation and artillery brigades. Exercising this option will require that the Unified Commander relook at what augmentation he can make available to the JTF commander thereby allowing the corps commander to leave behind a larger portion of his corps staff when standing up as a JTF. As such, it will be essential that those personnel identified to remain with the corps be allowed to train as

a staff. This will be difficult to accomplish without creating an OPTEMPO that may debilitate the corps and its organizations. However, it will be imperative that the core elements of the staff be made to come together and go through the crisis action planning process. Methods of accomplishing this may be allowing the "stay behind staff" to lead the participation in various exercises and other training events.

We have discussed the staff of the corps that will conduct the warfight. Who will command the corps? Currently upon JTF activation, the deputy corps commander assumes the responsibilities of deputy commander of the JTF with responsibility for:

1. Assuming responsibilities of the CJTF when designated.
2. Chairing the Joint Target Coordination Board.
3. Commensurate with service affiliation, assuming commanding and controlling (C2) of a specified service or functional area as directed by the CJTF.²⁴

Based on this last bullet, it is probable the corps deputy commanding general will stay with the corps to oversee and lead the newly formed staff and command the corps during the warfight.

¹HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1996), 1-4.

²Ibid., 1-1.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 1-2.

⁶Ibid., 1-5.

⁷Ibid, 1-7.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰USEUCOM, Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization, (Stuttgart, Germany: 7 July 1995), EX-1.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., B-1.

¹³Ibid., EX-2.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., B-1.

¹⁷USACOM, Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures, (Suffolk, VA: 1996), 3.

¹⁸Ibid., 7.

¹⁹HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-15-1, Corps Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, (Ft Leavenworth, KS: 1 June 1996 (Initial Draft)), D-9.

²⁰HQ, Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-2.

²¹Ibid., 3-3.

²²USEUCOM, Directive 55-11, Joint Task Force Headquarters Policies, Procedures, and Organization, (Stuttgart, Germany: 7 July 1995), B-1.

²³Joint Chiefs Staff, Joint Pub of 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 September 1993), II-7.

²⁴HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Joint Task Force Standing Operating Procedures, (Fort Bragg, NC, 1 December 1996), 1-2-3.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

An Army Corps may be able to fight as a corps while simultaneously serving as a unilateral joint task force headquarters. During future conflicts, it is unlikely that a combatant commander will conduct a mid-to-high intensity operations with his own staff as was the case with CENTCOM during Desert Storm. Instead it is probable that the scope of future conflicts will require the unified commander to form and activate a JTF to deal with these contingencies so that he might maintain his focus on the theater as a whole. The Army is well positioned to support unified commanders in future contingencies by providing corps headquarters to serve as the nucleus of JTF headquarters. These units are proven to be trained, ready, and capable of commanding and controlling significant amounts of combat power when activated as JTFs. However, if the corps headquarters that is serving as the JTF headquarters is also required to simultaneously warfight the corps, the Army may not be prepared to support this scenario.

Based on a review of current literature, joint publications, Army doctrine, and analysis of their contents, the following observations are made with respect to available guidance when activating a corps as a JTF headquarters and requiring it to simultaneously warfight the corps.

Table 3

Availability of Information Pertaining to a Warfighting
Corps Headquarters Simultaneously Serving as a JTF
Headquarters

	Joint Pubs	Army Doctrine	EUCOM Directive	ACOM SOP	V Corps SOP	XVIII Corps SOP
JTF	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Corps	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Both	No	No	No	No	No	No
JTF Aug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Corps Aug	No	No	No	No	No	No

This table addresses the following:

1. JTF--All material analyzed provides some guidance pertaining to how an Army corps headquarters will stand-up and conduct operations as a JTF HQ.
2. Corps--All material analyzed with the exception of joint publications, provides some guidance as to how an Army corps headquarters will fight the corps.
3. Both--None of the material analyzed provides guidance pertaining to how the Army corps headquarters will simultaneously serve as a JTF HQs *and* serve as the corps HQ that fights the corps.
4. JTF Aug--All material analyzed provides some guidance pertaining to augmentation of the Army corps headquarters when activating as an JTF HQ.

5. Corps Aug--None of the material analyzed provides guidance pertaining to augmentation of the Army corps headquarters serving as the JTF HQ and simultaneously fighting the corps.

It is key to note in the above findings that nothing is found in joint publications, Army doctrine, or unified command and Army corps standing operating procedures that provide guidance pertaining to an Army corps simultaneously serving as a JTF HQ and warfighting the corps.

If a corps headquarters is required to simultaneously serve as both the headquarters of the warfighting corps and the JTF headquarters, augmentation will become an issue. The corps headquarters will be required to provide the majority of it's headquarters manpower to comprise the JTF headquarters. **If the corps undertakes this dual mission, augmentation will have to be provided to the corps to replace the primary staff that will leave to compose the JTF headquarters.** Since the majority of the corps staff will be working for the JTF, the capabilities that these staff officers provide will have to be replaced for the corps to conduct it's warfighting mission. Since doctrinally there is no support available to assist the corps headquarters with the planning of this mission, augmentation of the staff will have to be thought out independently by the corps staff in advance. This augmentation will be primarily Army personnel originating from sources yet to be determined.

As the Army corps plans to augment it's headquarters to accomplish it's dual mission, it will likely look to subordinate units to augment and replace the staff that is serving in the joint task force headquarters. The higher unified headquarters will have already given it's augmentation to the formation of the JTF headquarters. Augmentation of the corps would require primarily Army personnel

anyway. It is unlikely that other corps headquarters would be required to fall-in on or replace the remainder of the corps headquarters that will conduct the corps warfight. This would not be a practical or timely use of another corps. Nor is practical to expect a division headquarters to conduct the corps warfight. A division level headquarters is simply not equipped to accomplish this mission. The corps will likely require subordinate units to supply augmentation from their own operating strength.

Recommendations

As it is likely that a corps headquarters will serve to fill this important role in the future, the following recommendations are made to identify possible shortcomings should they arise:

1. The possibility exists that a corps headquarters that forms the nucleus of a JTF headquarters could be required to simultaneously fight the corps as well. It is recommended that how this scenario might be accomplished be studied by the headquarters of current Army corps. The possibility of such an occurrence makes it important for the various corps to develop a concept of how to attack this potential problem.

2. It is recommended that the findings of these units should be coordinated with their probable respective unified commands and then provided to TRADOC for the development of Army doctrine in this area. It is important to develop the requirements of the corps so as to identify capabilities, shortcomings and needs for support to the establishing authority of the JTF.

3. Once it is determined how the warfighting corps headquarters will be manned following activation of the JTF, it is recommended that these individuals be

allowed to train and exercise together on a repetitive basis. This will prove to be critical due to the perishable nature of such staff skills. The turn-over of assigned personnel on a regular basis, unfamiliarity with augmentees, and varying scenarios, make it crucial that a basic core of this identified team be allowed to work together on an periodical basis to develop some sense of awareness of how this staff will function if called upon to operate the corps in the absence of the primary staff officers and other staff.

4. Should it be determined that units subordinate to the corps are required to augment the corps staff following the activation of a JTF, it is recommended that TRADOC expand this scenario to be included in division doctrine. It is important for divisional headquarters who may be required to augment the headquarters of a corps, to have considered this situation in advance. These units will perhaps want to establish battle-rostered selected personnel to provide timely response to the higher headquarters. It is also important for these units to have considered how they themselves will operate in the absence of the personnel they will send to the corps.

5. Finally, it is recommended that augmentation of a corps headquarters that is simultaneously conducting the corps warfight and serving as the JTF headquarters, is an excellent scenario to plan for the use of reserve personnel. The specific positions within the staff that require augmentation can be identified as those to be filled by reservists. Individual augmentees could familiarize with these duty positions during their annual training and on selected exercises. Call up of individual augmentees would be quick and responsive as compared to unit call ups.

FIGURES




Figure 1. A Typical Corps Staff. Source: HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1996), 1-6.




Figure 2. A Typical Corps Organization. Source: HQ, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1996), 1-7.




Figure 3. Basic Division Design. Source: HQ, Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-9.

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
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
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